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Abstract
This paper addresses why it is beneﬁcial for a society to restrict the use of nominal
bonds as a means of payment for goods. The model has a centralized asset market
and a decentralized goods market. Individuals face matching shocks that aﬀect the
marginal utility of consumption, but they cannot insure, borrow or trade assets
against such risks. The government imposes a legal restriction to prohibit nominal
bonds from being used as a means of payment in a subset of trades. I show that this
partial legal restriction can improve the society’s welfare. In contrast to the literature,
the eﬃciency role of the restriction exists in the steady state and it does not require
the households to be able to trade assets after receiving the shocks. Moreover, even
when lump-sum taxes are available, the eﬃciency role continues to exist under a
condition that induces optimal money growth to be above the Friedman rule.
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Nominal bonds have coexisted with ﬁat money for a long time. For countries like the U.S.
in the recent history, government bonds bear little default risk and have all the intrinsic
features that money has, but they are discounted and bear positive nominal interest. This
s o - c a l l e dr e t u r nd o m i n a n c eh a sr e q u i r e dr e s ources to maintain it. In many countries,
diﬀerent branches of the government are created to manage money and bonds separately.
In the U.S., for example, the Federal Reserve Bank issues money, while the Treasury
issues government bonds. These facts raise the following question: why should a society
distinguish bonds from money? Put diﬀerently, can return dominance improve eﬃciency?
The answer is no in most models in the literature. As early as Hicks (1939), monetary
theory has explained return dominance by imposing restrictions on bonds, such as reserve
requirements, cash in advance, and money in the utility function. These restrictions reduce
the extent to which bonds can serve as a medium of exchange. To compensate for the lower
liquidity, bonds must earn positive nominal interest in the equilibrium. In most models,
however, these diﬀerences in liquidity and returns distort the allocation of resources. By
eliminating the restrictions, the society is better oﬀ.
This result that return dominance does not improve eﬃciency is unsatisfactory. It fails
to explain why return dominance has survived for such a long time or to justify the resources
devoted to maintaining return dominance. On the policy side, the result fails to provide
an eﬃciency basis for monetary policy. Return dominance is necessary for monetary policy
to achieve its eﬀects. For example, open market operations exploit the positive discount
on bonds, and the overnight market relies on collateral that has a higher rate of return
than money. In the extensive literature on open market operations (e.g., Lucas, 1990),
return dominance reduces eﬃciency, but eliminating return dominance also eliminates the
real eﬀect of monetary policy. It is desirable to analyze the eﬀects of monetary policy in a
model where return dominance and illiquid bonds enhance eﬃciency.
To address the main question, I introduce nominal bonds and a legal restriction into a
search model of money (Shi, 1997). The government sells bonds for money in a centralized
1market. In a separate market, goods are sold in a decentralized way. That is, agents
are matched in pairs, trading histories are private, and every trade requires a medium of
exchange. Each good can be either red or green, which is determined after individuals are
matched. The two colors are equally costly to produce, but they yield diﬀerent marginal
utilities. The marginal utility of red goods relative to green goods is θ. Although green
goods can be purchased with both money and bonds, a legal restriction prohibits the use
of bonds as the means of payment for red goods.
In the ﬁrst version of the current model, the legal restriction is assumed to be enforced
costlessly. I show that the legal restriction can increase the society’s steady-state welfare
when the relative taste for red goods, θ,i sl e s st h a no n e ,b u tn o tt o os m a l l .T h er e a s o nf o r
this result is simple. The legal restriction reduces the quantity of red goods and increases
the quantity of green goods traded in a match. When θ is less than one, this shift of
consumption from red goods to green goods reduces the gap between the marginal utilities
of the two goods and, hence, increases the expected utility. Put diﬀerently, bonds under
the legal restriction serve as partial insurance against the matching shocks.
This eﬃciency role exists for all money growth rates above the Friedman rule, i.e.,
above the discount factor. However, the role vanishes at the Friedman rule, where holding
money provides perfect self insurance against the matching shocks. Because the Friedman
rule is optimal in a wide class of models, an important issue is whether the legal restriction
can continue to improve eﬃciency when monetary policy is set optimally.
To address this issue, I explore the eﬀect of money growth on the extensive margin of
trade, i.e., the number of trades in the goods market. The number of trades is an important
consideration for eﬃciency, in addition to the quantity of goods traded, when the goods
market is decentralized. Search externalities in the market can make the number of trades
generically ineﬃcient. To reduce this ineﬃciency, a policy should bring the division of
the match surplus between buyers and sellers closer to the principle described by Hosios
(1990). I specify the condition under which money growth above the Friedman rule can
achieve this improvement. Under this condition, restricting the liquidity of nominal bonds
improves the society’s welfare even under optimal money growth. Note that it is diﬃcult
2to obtain this result in traditional models because they assume a centralized goods market,
in which the extensive margin of trade is unimportant.
In the second version of the current model, I introduce government sellers to enforce
the restriction. Like a private seller, a government seller can produce either red or green
goods, and the color is determined by the shock in each match. In contrast to a private
seller, a government seller refuses to accept bonds as a means of payment in a trade where
the good is red. In all other trades, including those where government sellers produce green
goods, the buyers can use both money and bonds as payments. All the main results in the
ﬁrst version of the model continue to hold in this version of the model.
Bryant and Wallace (1984) are among the ﬁrst who have examined a legal restriction
on nominal bonds. In their model of overlapping generations, bonds have large denomina-
tions, and a legal restriction prohibits intermediaries from issuing small-denomination bills.
Because the indivisibility of bonds makes an agent’s consumption set non-convex, there
is price discrimination depending on whether agents hold bonds. This discrimination can
increase the expected utility when lump-sum taxes are not possible. In contrast, my model
does not have indivisibility, and the legal restriction directly prevents agents from using
b o n d sa sp a y m e n t si nas u b s e to ft r a d e s . 1 Moreover, the legal restriction can continue to
improve eﬃciency in my model even when it is feasible for the government to follow the
Friedman rule by collecting lump-sum taxes.
Kocherlakota (2003) published another well-known paper on the eﬃciency role of illiquid
bonds. Modeling the goods market as centralized exchange, Kocherlakota introduces taste
shocks in the ﬁrst period of the economy. He shows that illiquid bonds can increase the
expected utility if agents can trade assets after observing taste shocks. Agents with high
taste shocks sell bonds for money to increase current consumption, while agents with low
taste shocks buy bonds to increase future consumption. Thus, the asset trade enables
agents to partially smooth marginal utility. I shut down this asset trade by assuming that
1It is awkward to introduce non-convexity into my model. Because each household experiences a large
number of trades, consumption sharing within each household convexiﬁes the model even if indivisible
bonds are introduced. Also, note that the type of non-convexity in Bryant and Wallace (1984) is eliminated
if individuals can participate in lotteries that allocate the large-denomination bonds.
3the shocks occur within the matches, at which time individuals are separated from each
other and hence cannot trade assets. This deliberate assumption allows me to focus on
ad i ﬀerent mechanism of partial insurance achieved by illiquid bonds, i.e., smoothing the
marginal utility between matches rather than between agents.2
There are two other main diﬀerences between this paper and the one by Kocherlakota
(2003). First, the eﬃciency role of illiquid bonds exists in Kocherlakota’s model only in
one period, and it is challenging to extend his model in a tractable way to sustain this
eﬃciency role. My model is tractable and the legal restriction can improve eﬃciency in the
steady state. Second, allowing for lump-sum taxes eliminates the eﬃciency role of illiquid
bonds in Kocherlakota (2003), but not necessarily so in this paper.
Some other related papers are as follows. Wallace (1983) argues explicitly that legal
restrictions on nominal bonds are ineﬃcient in an overlapping generations model. Aiyagari
et al. (1996) examine the competition between money and bonds in a search model, but
their results are diﬃcult to interpret due to the assumption of indivisible money and bonds.
I eliminate this assumption using the model of Shi (1997). Finally, Sun (2005) and Boel and
Camera (2006) establish an eﬃciency role of illiquid bonds but, as Kocherlakota (2003),
they assume that individuals can trade assets after observing the taste shocks.3
2. A Search Economy with the Legal Restriction
2.1. Households, Matches and Assets
Consider a discrete-time economy with many types of households. In each type, the num-
ber of households is large and normalized to one. These households desire a particular
good, called the households’ consumption good, which is produced by some other types of
households. All goods are perishable at the end of each period and all households have the
2Exploring a diﬀerent mechanism can lead us to a robust role of illiquid bonds. If agents can trade in
the asset market after observing the taste shocks, they may also be able to borrow and lend, either directly
or indirectly through the government (e.g., Berentsen, Camera and Waller, 2007). Such borrowing and
lending could supersede the partial insurance role of illiquid bonds emphasized by Kocherlakota (2003).
3In a previous paper (Shi, 2005), I construct a search model where money and bonds are divisible and
where a legal restriction exists. However, that paper does not examine the eﬃciency role of the legal
restriction. Neither does Andolfatto (2006), who extends the model of Wallace (1983).
4same discount factor β ∈ (0,1).
A household consists of a large number of members (normalized to one) who share con-
sumption each period and regard the household’s utility as the common objective. This
assumption maintains tractability by making the distribution of money holdings across
households degenerate despite the presence of random matching.4 I select an arbitrary
household as the representative household. Throughout this paper, lower-case variables
denote this representative household’s choices, while upper-case variables denote the cor-
responding choices of other households or aggregate variables.
The representative household divides the members into three groups: sellers/producers
(a fraction σ), buyers (a fraction n − σ), and leisure seekers (a fraction 1 − n). A seller
can produce and sell goods, while a buyer buys consumption goods for the household. The
household chooses n, the fraction of market participants. To simplify the analysis, I assume
that σ is constant so that choosing n is equivalent to choosing the measure of buyers.5
Each type of goods can be one of the two colors, “red” or “green”. The cost of producing
the two colors is speciﬁed by the same disutility function, ψ(.). The utility generated by
a good of color i is θiu(ci), where i ∈ {R,G}, θG =1a n dθR = θ (> 0). The function
ψ satisﬁes: ψ(0) = 0, ψ0(0) = 0, ψ0(q) > 0a n dψ00(q) > 0f o ra l lq>0. The function u
satisﬁes: u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u0(0) = ∞ and u0(∞)=0 . 6 In addition, the utility of leisure in
the household is h(1 − n), where h(0) = 0, h0(0) = ∞, h0 > 0a n dh00 < 0.
In the goods market, buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pairs where there is
no double coincidence of wants. A trade match is a match in which the seller can produce
the consumption good of the buyer’s household. The total number of trade matches per
household in a period is assumed to be αN,w h e r eα > 0i sac o n s t a n ta n dN is the measure
of market participants per household. A buyer encounters a trade match with probability
αN/(N − σ), and a seller with probability αN/σ. Assume that α is suﬃciently small so
4The assumption of large households is a modeling device extended from Lucas (1990), which is meant to
capture an individual agent’s allocation of time over diﬀerent activities (see Shi, 1997). For an alternative
way to make the distribution of asset holdings degenerate, see Lagos and Wright (2005).
5See Shi (2001) for a search model where the measures of buyers and sellers are both endogenous.
6The analytical results hold for a more general speciﬁcation u(ci,θi), where the derivative of u with
respect to c is increasing in θ.
5that these expressions are bounded in [0,1].
Once a buyer and a seller are matched, the seller receives a shock that determines
whether he can produce the red or the green good, with probability 1/2 for each color.
Let me call this shock a matching shock, because it occurs within each match. A trade
m a t c hi nw h i c hag o o do fc o l o ri is produced is called a color i trade. The matching
shocks are identically and independently distributed across matches and over time. For
each household, the number of trade matches of each color is deterministic because each
household consists of a large number of market participants.
In each trade, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. This assumption simpliﬁes the
determination of the trading quantities. Note that the assumption does not lead to a trivial
division of household members because of the earlier assumption that the measure of sellers
is ﬁxed. For an analysis where the measures of buyers and sellers are both endogenous and
where the surplus division between a buyer and a seller is interior, see Shi (2001).
As is common in monetary models, the trading history of each household is private
information. Thus, credit cannot be used and every trade entails a medium of exchange.
Two assets can perform this role, ﬁat money and nominal bonds. Both assets are issued by
the government and can be stored without cost. The two assets are intrinsically worthless;
i.e., they do not yield direct utility or facilitate production. Bonds are default-free, one-
period bonds. At maturity, a bond can be redeemed for one unit of money. Without loss
of generality, I assume that bonds are redeemed immediately at maturity.7
The only diﬀerence between money and bonds is created by a partial legal restriction.
While money can be used in both red and green trades, the legal restriction forbids the use
of bonds as a means of payment in red trades. For now, I assume that the legal restriction
is always enforced costlessly. The main results of the model hold even when government
agents are introduced to enforce the legal restriction (see section 4).
In addition to the goods market, there is an asset market where the government sells
new bonds for money at an equilibrium price and redeems matured bonds. Let zM be the
7In principle, a household can choose not to redeem the bonds at maturity and, instead, use them as a
medium of exchange. However, such a choice is not optimal if there is a slight chance that the bonds will
be rejected in trade as a result of the legal restriction (see Shi, 2005).
6nominal amount of new bonds sold in each period, where z ∈ (0,∞)i sac o n s t a n ta n dM
is the average stock of money per household. The government prints money and collects
lump-sum taxes to pay for the redemption of matured bonds. To focus on a stationary
equilibrium, I assume that the eﬀe c to fo p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n so nt h em o n e ys u p p l yi s
sterilized by lump-sum transfers. That is, the transfers keep money holdings per household
growing at a constant (gross) rate γ ≥ β.W h e n γ < 1, the transfers are negative and,
hence, are taxes. Normalize all nominal quantities and prices of goods by M.
2.2. Timing of Events and Capital Market Imperfections
Pick an arbitrary period t and suppress the time index t. Figure 1 depicts the timing of
events in a period. First, the asset market opens. The representative household redeems
matured bonds, receives lump-sum monetary transfers, T, and purchases new bonds. The
(normalized) amount of new bonds sold by the government is z, which is exogenous. After
the trade, the household’s holdings consist of money, m,a n db o n d s ,b. Then, the asset



















Figure 1. Timing of events in a period
Next, the household chooses n, the fraction of members who will participate in the
goods market. Also, the household gives the assets to the buyers and instructs them on
the quantities of trade. Because the matching shocks have not realized yet, the household
allocates the assets evenly among the buyers. Each buyer gets m/(n − σ)u n i t so fm o n e y
and b/(n−σ) units of bonds. Moreover, the household gives the instructions to its buyers on
the oﬀers they will make. Contingent on the realization of the matching shock, i ∈ {R,G},
an oﬀer consists of the amount of goods to be purchased, qi, and the amount of assets to
be spent, xi. Because of the legal restriction, xR must consist of only money.
7Afterward, the traders go to the goods market. Buyers and sellers are matched in pairs.
In each match, the matching shock is realized to determine whether the seller can produce
r e do rg r e e ng o o d s .T h eb u y e r sm a k et h eo ﬀers instructed earlier by the household. After
the trade, the members bring the receipts of assets and goods back to the household. All
members in the household share the same consumption. Then, the period ends.
Because all the households are symmetric, borrowing and lending between households is
irrelevant in this model. What a household would like to do is to redistribute assets between
matches that have received diﬀerent shocks, but this redistribution is not possible because
the exchange is decentralized. This inability to trade assets between matches captures the
capital market imperfection that the asset market is closed sometimes when individuals
need liquidity, albeit for a short time, or that it is costly to go between the asset market
and the goods market. As explained in the introduction, introducing these imperfections
allows me to uncover a new channel through which illiquid bonds can improve eﬃciency,
as opposed to the channel in Kocherlakota (2003).8
2.3. Quantities of Trade in the Matches
Let m be the household’s holdings of money and b the holdings of bonds immediately after
trading in the asset market. The holdings are normalized by the aggregate stock of money
holdings per household. Let v(m,b):R+ × R+ → R be the household’s value function.














where the subscript ±j stands for t ± j. The future value of an asset is discounted by
money growth γ,a sw e l la sβ,b e c a u s em+1 is normalized by next period’s money stock.
Other households’ values of the assets are denoted similarly with Ω.
In each trade, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The oﬀer must induce the
seller to trade. Because the seller’s surplus in a color i trade is equal to [Ωmxi−ψ(qi)], the
8Note also that insurance contracts between households are irrelevant here, because all households have
the same consumption and output. For dynamic contracts in a monetary model with private information,
see Temzelides and Williamson (2001).




m, i = R,G. (2.2)











For a red trade, (2.3) embodies the legal restriction. For a green trade, (2.4) shows that it is
unnecessary to specify how an oﬀer consists of money and bonds. The two assets have the
same continuation value. Upon exiting from the trade, the only thing the household can do
with the assets is to bring them to the next period, at which time bonds will mature and
can be redeemed for money at par. More precisely, the two assets have the same marginal
value ωm to the buyer and Ωm to the seller.
If either (2.3) or (2.4) binds, money generates liquidity services or non-pecuniary returns.
In contrast, bonds yield liquidity services only if (2.4) binds. Bonds are perfect substitutes
for money if they have the same value as money, i.e., if ωb = ωm.
2.4. A Household’s Decision Problem
In each period, the household chooses the measure of market participants, n, the quantities
of trade, (qi,x i), consumption, ci, and future asset holdings, (m+1,b +1). Taking other
households’ decisions as given, the household solves the following problem:































i,i ∈ {R,G}. (2.6)
The constraints are (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and the following:





















where S+1 is the nominal price of bonds in the next period.
9In (2.6), the total number of color i trades that the household’s buyers experience is
αN/[2(N − σ)]. Multiplying it by the number of buyers in the household, n − σ,a n d
by the quantity of goods in each color i trade yields the level of consumption. Similarly,
total disutility incurred by the household’s sellers in producing color i goods is ψ(Qi)αN/2,
where Qi is the quantity proposed by a buyer of other households.
Equation (2.7) describes how the household’s asset holdings evolve. Starting at the time
in a period immediately after trading in the asset market (see Figure 1), the household’s













In addition, the household will redeem matured bonds for money and receive monetary
transfers at the beginning of next period. The resulting amount of assets is given by the
right-hand side of (2.7), which will be used to update the portfolio.
2.5. Optimal Choices
Let λR be the shadow price of (2.3), and λG of (2.4). To simplify the formulas, multiply
λi by the number of color i trades,
αN(n−σ)
2(N−σ) , before incorporating the constraint into the


























































In (2.8), the quantity of assets that a buyer must give to the seller in order to obtain
one unit of color i good is ψ0(qi)/Ωm. The cost of each unit of asset is equal to the future
10value of the asset, ωm, plus the shadow cost of the asset constraint, λi. Thus, (2.8) requires
that the cost of the assets to a buyer be equal to the marginal utility of consumption of a
color i good. (2.9) states the fact that the nominal price of bonds is equal to the relative
value of bonds to money before the goods market opens. Thus, bonds are discounted only
if they are not perfect substitutes for money in the goods market.
To explain the envelope conditions, take the condition for money, (2.10), for example.
The current value of money is given by the left-hand side of (2.10), where ωm
−1 is multiplied
by γ/β,b e c a u s eωm
−1 is deﬁned as the current value of money discounted to one period
earlier. The right-hand side of (2.10) consists of the (discounted) future value of money,
ωm, and expected liquidity services generated by money in the goods market. Thus, (2.10)
requires the current value of money to be equal to the future value of money plus the
expected liquidity services generated by money. The condition for bonds, (2.11), is similar
except that bonds do not generate liquidity services in red trades. Thus, ωb < ωm if and
only if λR > 0, i.e., if the legal restriction binds.
Finally, (2.12) requires that the marginal disutility of allocating a member to the goods
market (as a buyer) is equal to the expected gain. In the goods market, a buyer encounters
ac o l o ri trade with probability αN/[2(N − σ)]. The net gain from a color i trade to the
buyer’s household is [θiu0(ci)qi − (ω + λi)xi]. After substituting xi from (2.2) and λi from
(2.8), the net gain becomes the expression inside the summation in (2.12).
2.6. Stationary Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of the representative household’s choices, (n,q,x,c,m+1,b +1), the
value function v, the shadow values of assets (ωm,ωb), and other households’ choices such
that the following requirements are met. (i) Optimality: given other households’ choices,
the household’s choices solve (PH) and the value function satisﬁes (2.5); (ii) symmetry:
the choices and shadow prices are the same across the households; (iii) clearing of the bonds
market: b = z; (iv) positive and ﬁnite values of assets: 0 < ωm
−1m<∞ and 0 < ωb
−1b<∞;
(v) stationarity: all real variables and the values (ωm
−1m,ωb
−1b) are constant.
The requirement (iv) restricts the values of the two assets to be positive in order to
11examine coexistence, and ﬁnite in order to use the ﬁrst-order conditions to characterize the
optimal decisions. Moreover, (iii) implies that the choice of b is interior, while stationarity
implies ωm
−1 = ωm and ωb
−1 = ωb. Symmetry implies m = M = 1. In the following analysis,
I will equate the upper-case variables to the corresponding lower-case variables.
Let me characterize the equilibrium with γ > β. (To obtain the allocation under the
Friedman rule, one can take the limit γ ↓ β.) With γ > β,e i t h e rλR > 0o rλG > 0o r
both. If both λ’es were zero, a stationary equilibrium would fail to exist for all γ > β.
Thus, there are three cases of the equilibrium, depending on whether one or two of the













= k, for k>0. (2.14)
The quantity of goods in a color i trade is f(k/θi,n), where k diﬀers in the three cases.
Note that f (k,n) decreases in (k,n). For all n ∈ (σ,1), γ > β implies μ > 0.
Consider ﬁrst the case where λR =0< λG. Refer to this case as Case PS (for perfect
substitutability) and denote the quantity of goods in a color i trade as qi
1. Because the legal
restriction does not bind in this case, bonds are perfect substitutes for money. Precisely,
(2.10) and (2.11) imply ωb = ωm, and (2.9) yields S =1 .T oo b t a i nqG
1 ,s u b s t i t u t eλG from
(2.8) and λR = 0 into (2.10). This procedure yields an equation for qG
1 . Setting λR =0i n
(2.8), I obtain an equation for qR
1 .U s i n gf deﬁned in (2.14), I express:
q
G
1 (n) ≡ f (1 + 2μ(n),n),q
R






Now consider the case where λR > 0=λG. Refer to this case as Case TS (for terrible
substitutability) and denote the quantity of goods in a color i trade as qi
3. Because the legal
restriction binds in this case, ωb < ωm. (2.11) implies ωb
−1 = ωmβ/γ.B e c a u s eωb = ωb
−1,
(2.9) yields S = β/γ. As in the above approach, I obtain:
q
G
3 (n) ≡ f(1,n),q
R







12Finally, consider the case where λR > 0a n dλG > 0. Refer to this case as Case IS (for
imperfect substitutability) and denote the quantity of goods in a color i trade as qi
2.T h i s
case lies between Case PS and Case TS. As in Case TS, bonds are not perfect substitutes
for money in the goods market, because λR > 0. However, since bonds yield liquidity
services in green trades, they are not discounted by as much as in Case TS. Substituting
ωb
−1 = Sωm
−1 into (2.11), I obtain an equation for qG
2 ,g i v e nS. Subtracting (2.11) from
(2.10), I obtain an equation for qR































, for i = G,R. (2.18)







− (1 + z)=0 . (2.19)
This equation determines S = S(n), for any given n. Then, qi
2 (n)=Qi
2 (S (n),n).
In each case, n solves (2.12). Let the equilibrium solution for n be n1 in Case PS, n2
in Case IS, and n3 is TS. The following proposition describes existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium (see Appendix A for a proof):





. Assume that γ > β and that z is suﬃ-
ciently close to zero. If γ < γ0, then a unique equilibrium exists and is characterized as in
Table 1, where θ1 and θ3 are speciﬁed in Appendix A.
Table 1. Three cases of the equilibrium
Case PS Case IS Case TS
existence 0 < θ ≤ θ1 (< 1) θ1 < θ < θ3 θ ≥ θ3
asset constraints λR =0< λG λR > 0, λG > 0 λR > 0=λG























When z ↓ 0, θ1 −→ 1/[1 + 2μ(n1)] and θ3 −→ [1 + 2μ(n3)].
13The properties stated in the proposition are intuitive. When the tastes for red goods
are low in the sense that θ < θ1, a buyer in a red trade does not spend all of his money.
Since the legal restriction in the goods market does not bind in this case, bonds are perfect
substitutes for money. When the tastes for red goods are high in the sense that θ > θ3,a
buyer in a red trade is constrained by the amount of his money holdings, but a buyer in a
green trade is not constrained. Bonds are bad substitutes for money in this case. When the
tastes for red goods are intermediate in the sense that θ1 < θ < θ3, the asset constraints
bind in both a red and a green trade. Bonds are not perfect substitutes for money, but its
substitutability for money is not as bad as in Case TS.
Bonds have diﬀerent prices in the three cases, which reﬂect the diﬀerence in the sub-
stitutability of bonds for money. The Fisher equation holds only in Case TS, i.e., only if
bonds do not generate any liquidity service in the goods market.
To conclude this section, let me remark that the conditions that γ < γ0 and that z is
small are suﬃcient conditions for existence. They are imposed to ensure that the solution
for n is unique in each case. If n were exogenous, then neither condition would be needed
for existence or uniqueness of the equilibrium.
3. Eﬃciency-Improving Role of the Legal Restriction
In this section I take two steps to examine when the legal restriction can improve the
society’s welfare. First, for any ﬁxed γ ∈ (β,γ0), where γ0 is speciﬁed in Proposition 2.1,
I show that the legal restriction can improve welfare. Second, I ﬁnd a condition under
which a deviation slightly above the Friedman rule is optimal. Under this condition, the
optimal joint policy requires money growth that is higher than the Friedman rule and a
legal restriction that distinguishes bonds from money in government liabilities. All proofs
for this section appear in Appendix B.
143 . 1 .W e l f a r eM e a s u r ea n dt h eW a yt oC o m p a r eE c o n o m i e s
Because the households are symmetric and there are no intrinsic dynamics, I measure social
welfare in the standard way by the following steady-state utility:


















+ h(1 − n). (3.1)
The legal restriction improves eﬃciency when it increases v.
To compare welfare, note that bonds are perfect substitutes for money in an economy
without the legal restriction. If bonds are eliminated from such an economy, nominal prices
of all goods will fall by the same proportion, leaving the real allocation unchanged. Thus,
t h er e a la l l o c a t i o ni na ne c o n o m yw i t h o u tt h elegal restriction is the same as the allocation
in an economy without bonds, provided that the money growth rate is ﬁxed. For this
reason, I will refer to the case z = 0 as an economy without the legal restriction and to
the eﬀects of an increase in z as the eﬀects of the legal restriction.
Taking the limit z → 0 in Proposition 2.1, I obtain the following allocation in an
economy without the legal restriction: (A) If θ ≤ (1 + 2μ)
−1,t h e nqG = qG
1 and qR = qR
1 ;
(B) If (1 + 2μ)





;( C )I fθ ≥ 1+2 μ,
then qG = qG
3 and qR = qR
3 . Note that Case A has the same allocation as Case PS, and
Case C has the same allocation as Case TS. That is, the legal restriction does not aﬀect
the real allocation when the tastes for the two types of goods are far from symmetric. For
this reason, I will only compare Case IS with Case B.
3.2. Eﬀects of the Legal Restriction with Fixed Money Growth
Let me ﬁrst isolate the eﬀects of the legal restriction by ﬁxing money growth at γ ∈ (β,γ0).
Consider the intensive margin of trade, represented by qR and qG, and the extensive margin,
n, which determines the number of trades. The following lemma documents the eﬀects of
the legal restriction on the two margins:
Lemma 3.1. For any ﬁxed γ ∈ (β,γ0), a marginal increase in z from z =0increases qG
2 ,
reduces qR
2 ,b u ti th a sn oe ﬀect on n.
15The legal restriction increases the quanti t yo fg o o d si nag r e e nt r a d ea n dr e d u c e st h e
quantity in a red trade. It is easy to understand why the quantity of goods in a red trade
falls: by depressing the purchasing power of both assets, the presence of bonds reduces the
quantity of goods that can be purchased with money alone. To explain why the quantity
of goods increases in a green trade, note that the purchasing power of assets falls by less
than the increase in the amount of bonds, because the legal restriction prevents some of
the bonds from being used to purchase goods. As a result, the real value of assets in a
green trade increases, which increases the quantity of goods traded there. Therefore, the
legal restriction shifts the purchasing power from red trades to green trades.
Prices do adjust to the increased amount of assets in the goods market. Express prices
of goods in terms of utility, i.e., by multiplying prices by the value of money, ωm.A f t e r
an increase in the amount of bonds, the price of green goods increases and the price of red
goods falls. However, these responses of prices do not fully oﬀset the shift of the purchasing
power between the two types of trades.
On the extensive margin of trade, n, the legal restriction has no ﬁrst-order eﬀect,
provided that money growth is constant. One way to explain this result is to note that
the optimal choice of n is determined by the expected marginal gain to a buyer. Because
buyers are the individuals who carry money into trades, the expected marginal gain to a
buyer is the non-pecuniary return to money, which must be equal to the opportunity cost
of holding money. When money growth is ﬁxed, the opportunity cost of holding money is
unchanged, and so the optimal choice of n does not change. Note that the legal restriction
reduces the marginal gain to a buyer in a green trade as qG
2 increases, and increases the
marginal gain in a red trade as qR
2 decreases. The constancy of n with respect to z means
that these changes in the marginal gains exactly cancel out. That is, the legal restriction
does not aﬀect the expected sum of marginal utilities of the two goods.
However, the legal restriction does aﬀect the expected level of utility, as stated below:
Proposition 3.2. Fix γ ∈ (β,γ0) and assume that z is suﬃciently small. The legal
restriction improves eﬃciency if and only if 1/(1 + 2μ) < θ < 1.T h i s r e g i o n o f θ is
non-empty, provided γ > β.
16It is easy to explain this welfare eﬀect. When θ < 1, the household has a stronger desire
for green goods than for red goods. By shifting consumption from red goods to green goods,
while keeping constant the expected sum of marginal utilities of the two goods, the legal
restriction increases the expected level of utility. In this case, the legal restriction allows
bonds to serve as partial insurance against the matching shocks.9 If θ > 1, on the other
hand, the legal restriction reduces the expected utility.
The eﬃciency role of the legal restriction persists in the steady state and it does not
require agents to be able to trade assets after observing the taste shocks. Both features are
absent in Kocherlakota (2003). Moreover, because the legal restriction improves eﬃciency
by shifting consumption between matches, it is important that the legal restriction is
partial in the sense that it is imposed only in a fraction of trades. If the legal restriction
were imposed universally, then the restriction would only reduce nominal prices of goods
uniformly across all trades, in which case illiquid bonds would have no real eﬀect.
For any γ > β,t h ee ﬃciency role of the legal restriction exists in the speciﬁed region
of θ. However, the role disappears at the left border of the region, γ = β,w h i c hi st h e
Friedman rule. When γ = β, a household is indiﬀerent between spending a marginal unit
of money and holding it to the next period. In this case, the constraints (2.3) and (2.4)
do not bind, and the quantity of goods traded in a match equates the marginal utility of
consumption to the marginal cost of production. In this sense, money provides perfect
insurance against the matching shocks, and so it renders the legal restriction useless as a
device of indirect insurance.
This dependence of the eﬃciency role on γ > β is common in the literature. To justify
γ > β, the literature has assumed that the social planner is not able to collect lump-sum
taxes at all, e.g., Bryant and Wallace (1984) and Kocherlakota (2003). Because the above
proposition requires only the weaker assumption that the social planner cannot implement
t h eF r i e d m a nr u l e ,o n ep o s s i b l ew a yt os u p p o r tt h ee ﬃciency role of illiquid bonds is to
rationalize this weaker assumption. A more challenging way is to ﬁnd the condition under
9The condition θ > 1/(1 + 2μ) in the proposition comes from the existence condition for Case B. It is
needed because the legal restriction aﬀects the allocation only when both Case IS and Case B exist.
17which the Friedman rule is not optimal, as I will do below.
3.3. The Eﬃciency Role of the Legal Restriction under Optimal Money Growth
I ﬁrst analyze the case z =0a n dﬁnd a condition under which optimal money growth can
exceed the Friedman rule. In this case, continuity implies that there exists a neighborhood
of z ≥ 0 in which a small deviation of money growth above the Friedman rule is optimal.
Because Proposition 3.2 holds for all γ ∈ (β,γ0), there exists a neighborhood of θ < 1s u c h
that the legal restriction improves eﬃciency under optimal money growth. Key to this
result is the extensive margin of trade. Becau s et h i sm a r g i ni si m m a t e r i a li nc e n t r a l i z e d
markets, it is not surprising that the Friedman rule is optimal in traditional models such
as Bryant and Wallace (1984) and Kocherlakota (2003).
Let me continue to focus on the case where the asset constraints bind in all trades.
This is Case IS when z>0a n dC a s eBw h e nz =0 . I nC a s eB ,qG
2 = qR
2 = q2 and
(1 + θ)u0(c2)=2 ( 1+μ)ψ0(q2). Diﬀerentiating (2.12) with respect to γ and evaluating the


























Because qψ0 > ψ for all q>0, welfare increases with γ near γ = β if and only if n decreases
with γ. This result, together with the argument in the ﬁrst paragraph of this subsection,
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. A deviation slightly above the Friedman rule improves welfare if and
only if it reduces the number of buyers in the goods market and, hence, if and only if (3.2)
is satisﬁed. Therefore, under (3.2), there exists a neighborhood of θ < 1 where optimal
monetary policy is γ > β and where the legal restriction improves eﬃciency.
In contrast to the legal restriction, money growth aﬀects the extensive margin of trade
by aﬀecting the gain from trade to a buyer. In turn, this eﬀect can be decomposed into two
18eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is negative: money growth reduces the quantity of goods traded in a
match. The second eﬀect is positive: by reducing consumption, money growth increases the
marginal utility of consumption and hence increases the marginal value of goods received
from a trade. These two eﬀects work through the two terms in the summation of (2.12).
The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates if and only if (3.2) is satisﬁed. Under this condition, the gain
from trade and, hence, the number of buyers decreases with money growth.
Money growth also aﬀects the intensive margin of trade, because it reduces the quantity
o fg o o d st r a d e di nam a t c h .H o w e v e r ,w h e nγ is close to β,t h i si n t e n s i v em a r g i nh a so n l y
a second-order eﬀect on welfare, because the quantities of goods are close to the eﬃcient
ones that equate the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal cost of production.
In this case, the extensive margin is the dominating margin of welfare.
An increase in money growth slightly above the Friedman rule improves welfare if and
only if money growth reduces the number of buyers in the goods market. The explanation
lies in search externalities generated by households’ choices of n. Although the matching
rates depend on N, and the equilibrium implies N = n, all households take the matching
rates as given when choosing n. Thus, the equilibrium value of N can be ineﬃcient. The
number of buyers in the equilibrium is ineﬃciently high if and only if buyers’ bargaining
power exceeds their contribution to the creation of matches (see Hosios, 1990). In the
current model, a buyer in a trade takes the entire surplus of the match by assumption. To







That is, buyers are over-compensated and so the number of buyers is ineﬃciently high.
Inﬂation can increase eﬃciency by reducing the number of buyers.
To see whether (3.2) can be satisﬁed, consider the functional forms u(c)=c1−η−1
1−η and
ψ(q)=ψ0qξ,w h e r eη > 0, ξ > 1a n dψ0 > 0. Then, (3.2) is satisﬁed if and only if η < 1.
The suboptimality of the Friedman rule is robust in the following two senses. First, it
does not depend on the assumption that buyers have all the bargaining power in trade.
If sellers have suﬃciently high bargaining power, instead, then the measure of buyers can
19be ineﬃciently low rather than high, and eﬃciency entails an increase in the number of
buyers. Although the condition (3.2) needs to be revised in this case, or even reversed, the
general message remains true that optimal money growth can exceed the Friedman rule
in a non-empty region of parameter values (see Shi, 1997, and Berentsen, Rocheteau and
Shi, 2007). Second, the general message does not depend on the absence of direct taxes.
After introducing direct (distortionary) taxes in a similar environment and setting them
optimally, Ritter (2007) shows that optimal money growth can still exceed the Friedman
rule. With these qualiﬁcations, the above proposition states the general possibility that
the legal restriction can improve eﬃciency even under optimal monetary policy.
4. Enforcement of the Legal Restriction
I now address the issue of how to enforce the legal restriction. The proofs for this section
are omitted here and can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
Let me extend the basic model by adding a measure g>0 of government agents per
household. To simplify the analysis, assume that all government agents are sellers. A
government seller has the same disutility function of production as a private seller. The
color of the good that a government seller can produce is determined by a random draw
in each match, with probability 1/2 for either color. Assume that only government sellers
enforce the legal restriction in their trades and only when the good traded is red. In
contrast, a (private) buyer can use both money and bonds as payments in any trade with
other private agents or in a green trade with a government seller. Denote the fraction of
sellers who are government agents as π = g/(σ +g). Then, the legal restriction is enforced
in a fraction π/2 of the trades. For convenience, denote πR = π and πG =1− π.
The total number of trade matches per household per period is α(N + g), and so the
probability with which a buyer gets a trade match is α(N + g)/(N − σ). Conditional on
receiving a trade match, a buyer’s trading partner is a private seller with probability (1−π)
and a government seller with probability π. In either event, the good traded is red with
probability 1/2 and green with probability 1/2. Add the superscripts ij to the quantities
of goods and money traded in a match, where i ∈ {G,R} indicates the color of the good
20and j ∈ {p,g} indicates whether the seller is a private seller (p)o rag o v e r n m e n ts e l l e r( g).











, where i ∈ {G,R}.
Similarly, a private seller has a trade match with probability α(N + g)/(σ + g), and the
trade involves either of the two colors with probability 1/2. Because all buyers are private
agents, a household’s total disutility of production is:
α
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In each period, a household chooses (qGp,x Gp), (qRp,x Rp), (qGg,x Gg), (qRg,x Rg), cG, cR,
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To obtain (4.1) and (4.3), I have assumed that government sellers value money with the
same marginal value Ωm as private households do.
Focus on the case where money yields positive liquidity services at the margin in all
trades that involve private sellers, i.e., the case where (4.1) binds for j = p and (4.2) binds.
Then, it can be shown that all the trading constraints in (4.1) — (4.3) bind. Moreover, in
every trade without the legal restriction, the quantity of goods traded is equal to qG,a n d
the quantity of money traded is xG. In a trade with the legal restriction, qRg is less than
qG for all z>0 and equal to qG when z =0 .
21Let me redeﬁne the society’s welfare to include the disutility of production incurred
by government sellers, as well as the utility of private households.10 Let vg denote the













Let vs be the average value for an individual in the economy, which is obtained by giving the
same weight to all individuals. All private households together have the weight 1/(1 + g),




The legal restriction improves eﬃciency if it increases vs. Substituting v and vg,Ig e t :










As in the basic model, I refer to the economy with z = 0 as an economy without the
legal restriction and to the eﬀects of increasing z as those of the legal restriction.11 Modify








Deﬁne q0 = f(k0,n) as before, where k0 =2 /(1 + θ). Then, I have:
Proposition 4.1. Proposition 3.3 continues to hold in this economy, where the legal re-
striction is enforced only in red trades that involve government sellers.
Although cumbersome to be analyzed, this extended model yields the same analytical
results as the basic model. In particular, the same condition, (3.2), is needed for optimal
money growth to be above the Friedman rule. The diﬀerence from the basic model is minor
and quantitative, i.e., the modiﬁcation of f(k,n). The same intuition as in the basic model
explains why the legal restriction on the liquidity of bonds can improve eﬃciency.
10The value of money received from trade by government sellers is not counted in the social welfare
function because it is a transfer from the private sector to the government.
11It is tempting to use the parameter g as an alternative measure of the legal restriction and conduct
comparative statics. Doing so is misleading because a change in g changes the social welfare function even
when the legal restriction is absent.
225. Discussion
I discuss a few related issues. First, is the legal restriction “essential” in the sense that the
social planner can achieve better allocations with the legal restriction than without? The
answer is likely aﬃrmative, provided that the social planner cannot observe the types of
matches experienced by individuals. Although a formal support for this answer requires
a setup of mechanism design, which is outside the scope this paper, I provide an informal
argument as follows. The social planner needs to keep two reports of individuals’ histories
in order to allocate consumption and production eﬃciently. One is the report on whether
an individual is a buyer or a seller in a match. To record this type of histories, the
social planner can alter an individual’s money holdings. Another report is on whether an
individual has a red or green trade. Because the marginal utility of consumption depends
on the color of the goods, it is eﬃcient for the social planner to describe diﬀerent quantities
of goods to be traded in matches with diﬀerent colors. To record this type of histories, the
planner needs another asset. The legal restriction in my model implements this dependence
of an individual’s holdings of the second asset on the reported color of trade.
How can the second asset be interpreted as bonds, instead of any other asset? The
answer lies in the particular distinction between the two types of histories. That is, the
trades whose histories are recorded by the second asset in the planner’s mechanism are
a strict subset of the trades whose histories are kept by the ﬁrst asset (money). Bonds
with the legal restriction implement this distinction. In contrast, the distinction cannot
be implemented with two kinds of monies whose relative acceptability is unrestricted. For
example, suppose that the ﬁrst money is green and the second money is red. These two
monies can be designed to have diﬀerent prices or even a ﬁxed exchange rate. If both monies
are accepted as payments in all trades, the price diﬀerence does not reﬂect any diﬀerence in
acceptability. In this case, the holdings of the second money do not reﬂect any additional
information about the color of trades that an agent has experienced. Of course, the social
planner can elicit this information by making the red money unacceptable in red trades.
But then the red money is equivalent to nominal bonds in my model; whether it is called
23bonds has no importance.
Second, one may want to distinguish the eﬃciency result in this paper from the general
principle that introducing some distortions into an economy that already has imperfect
markets can improve eﬃciency. Although the economy in my analysis is distorted with
incomplete markets and bargaining, ﬁnding an additional distortion that can improve eﬃ-
ciency is not an easy task. In particular, introducing legal restrictions to generate return
dominance has reduced eﬃciency in most models in the literature. For this reason, the
result that the legal restriction can improve eﬃciency in my model is important.
Finally, one may ask why return dominance exists despite the apparent lack of legal
restrictions on issuing private money. Introducing private money with small denominations
will eliminate return dominance in Bryant and Wallace (1984), but not in my model. For
example, suppose that private money is introduced into the economy as described in section
4. If the legal restriction requires government sellers not to accept private money in red
trades, then private money must dominate ﬁat money in the rate of return, just as nominal
bonds must. Put diﬀerently, private money will unlikely be essential in addition to ﬁat
money and nominal bonds. Thus, the particular legal restriction in my model can provide
a normative answer to the question of why private money is not widespread.12
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I examined whether a legal restriction that reduces the liquidity of nominal
bonds can improve the society’s welfare. To do so, I introduced nominal bonds and an
asset market into a microfounded model of money. While the asset market is Walrasian,
the goods market is decentralized, where the government imposes a legal restriction in a
fraction of the trades. Individuals face matching shocks that aﬀect the marginal utility
of consumption, but they cannot insure, borrow or trade assets against such risks. I
show that the partial legal restriction can improve eﬃciency of the economy by serving as
12After I wrote the ﬁrst version of the current paper in 2002, I became aware of a paper by Rocheteau
(2002), who uses a search model to examine the legal restriction in the goods market. His model is diﬀerent
from mine. Also, his result on the welfare-improving role of the legal restriction is largely numerical and
he does not address the issue of how the legal restriction is enforced.
24partial insurance against the matching shocks. In contrast to some previous models (see
the introduction), the eﬃciency role of the legal restriction persists in the steady state,
and it does not require households to be able to trade bonds for money after receiving the
shocks. Moreover, even when lump-sum taxes are available, the legal restriction can still
improve welfare under a condition that induces optimal money growth to be above the
Friedman rule. I have also examined the enforcement of the legal restriction.
As explained in the introduction, the current model will be useful for analyzing mone-
tary policy, because it provides an eﬃciency role for return dominance that has been relied
upon in all monetary policy analyses. In particular, the model can be extended to incorpo-
rate limited participation that captures the liquidity eﬀect of open market operations (see
Lucas, 1990). By providing a microfoundation for money and open market operations, such
an extension will provide a justiﬁcation for the liquidity eﬀect on the basis of eﬃciency.
It may also uncover new propagation mechanisms for monetary shocks. This task is left
for a sequel.13 Another potential use of the current model is to examine whether there is
an eﬃciency gain to restricting the circulation of foreign currency in a country. Such a
restriction is similar to the legal restriction examined in the current paper.
13Williamson (2005) constructs a diﬀerent model of limited participation to prolong the real eﬀects of
monetary injection. However, he does not examine the essentiality of illiquid bonds.
25Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof consists of three parts. Part 1: Given the solution for n ∈ (σ,1), I characterize
each of the three cases. Part 2:D e t e r m i n en in each case. Part 3: Compare the n’es
and q’s among the three cases. While Parts 2 and 3 are relegated to the Supplementary
Appendix in order to economize on space, Part 1 is detailed below.
For Case PS to occur, the quantities (qR
1 ,qG
1 ) given by (2.15) must induce λR =0< λG.









where I have substituted the market clearing conditions m =1a n db = z. Combining the
two constraints to eliminate ωm, I obtain the following condition for Case PS:
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1 )f r o m( 2 . 1 5 )a n df from (2.14), I rewrite (A.1) as θ ≤ θ1 where





For all z>0a n dn ∈ (σ,1), Q1(n) <q G
1 (n)a n ds oΘ1(n) < [1 + 2μ(n)]
−1 < 1. If z ↓ 0,
then Q1(n1) −→ qG
1 (n1), in which case (A.2) and (2.15) imply θ1 −→ 1/[1 + 2μ(n1)].









ωm . Combining these two constraints yields:
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3 )f r o m( 2 . 1 6 )a n df from (2.14), I rewrite (A.3) as θ ≥ θ3 where
θ3 = Θ3(n3)a n dΘ3(n) ≡




For all z>0a n dn ∈ (σ,1), Q3(n) <q G
3 (n)a n ds oΘ3(n) < 1+2 μ(n). If z ↓ 0, then
Q3(n3) −→ qG
3 (n3), in which case (A.4) and (2.16) imply θ1 −→ 1/[1 + 2μ(n1)].
Now turn to Case IS. This case requires λR and λG to be positive. By (2.8), this
requirement is equivalent to θiu0(ci
2) > ψ0(qi
2)f o rb o t hi = G and i = R.T h a ti s ,kG > 1
26and kR > 1/θ. Using (2.18), I can express these requirements as β/γ <S<1. Temporarily
denote the left-hand side of (2.19) as LHS(S,n). For any given n ∈ (σ,1), kG(S,n)
increases in S and kR(S,n) decreases in S. Because f(k,n)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nk,t h e nQG
2 (S,n)
decreases in S and QR
2 (S,n)i n c r e a s e si nS.T h u s , LHS(S,n)d e c r e a s e si nS for any
given n ∈ (σ,1). Moreover, because QG
2 (β/γ,n)=qG
3 (n)a n dQR
2 (β/γ,n)=qR
3 (n), then
LHS(β/γ,n) > 0i ﬀ qR
3 (n) <Q 3(n), i.e., iﬀ θ < Θ3(n). Similarly, because QG
2 (1,n)=
qG
1 (n)a n dQR
2 (1,n)=qR
1 (n), then LHS(1,n) < 0i ﬀ qR
1 (n) >Q 1(n), i.e., iﬀ θ > Θ1(n). It
can be shown that n2 → n3 when S → β/γ,a n dt h a tn2 → n1 when S → 1. Therefore,
Case IS exists iﬀ θ1 = Θ1 (n1) < θ < Θ3 (n3)=θ3.
To show that θ1 < θ3 holds, note that, when z =0 ,Ih a v eΘ1(n)=[ 1+2 μ(n)]
−1 and
Θ3 (n)=1+2 μ(n). Thus, for all γ > β and all n,n0 ∈ (σ,1), I have Θ1(n) < Θ3 (n0). This
implies θ1 < θ3 when z is suﬃciently small. QED
B. Proofs for Section 3
Let me start with the proof of Lemma 3.1. Denote the derivative of f(k,n)t ot h ejth
argument as fj,w h e r ef is deﬁn e di n( 2 . 1 4 ) .T h e n ,f1 < 0a n df2 < 0. All the derivatives
below with respect to z are evaluated at z = 0, and the notation for this evaluation is
suppressed. Recall that, when z =0 ,qG
2 = qR
2 = q2 = f (k,n), where k =2 ( 1+μ)/(1+θ).





















where ki is deﬁned in (2.17) and where the argument of ψ and ψ0 is q2. Use the two results
































dz.I f dn/dz = 0, as stated in Lemma 3.1, then
dkG/dz < 0a n ddkR/dz > 0. In this case, (B.1) implies dqG
2 /dz > 0a n ddqR
2 /dz < 0.
27To show dn/dz =0 ,s u b s t i t u t eu0(ci
2)=kiψ0(qi





























Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to z, evaluating at z = 0, and substituting dq/dz
and dki/dz,Io b t a i ndn/dz = 0. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
To prove Proposition 3.2, diﬀerentiate the welfare measure in (3.1) with respect to z,











dv/dz > 0 if and only if θ < 1. Since this eﬀect exists only if Case IS and Case B both
exist, θ > [1 + 2μ(n1)]
−1 is required. Thus, when [1 + 2μ(n1)]
−1 < θ < 1a n dw h e nz is
small, dv/dz > 0 for all γ ∈ (β,γ0). Finally, this region of θ is non-empty if and only if
μ(n1) > 0, which is equivalent to γ > β. QED
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C. Parts 2 and 3 of the Proof of Proposition 2.1
Part 2. Determine n in each case. In Case PS, substitute u0(cG
1 )=( 1+2 μ)ψ0(qG
1 )a n d
θu0(cR
1 )=ψ0(qR
1 ) to rewrite (2.12) as
2h0 (1 − n)
αn



















Note that the expression αn
n−σ [1 + 2μ(n)] is a decreasing function of n, and so the left-hand
side of this equation increases in n.B e c a u s e μ(n)d e c r e a s e si nn,a n dqG
1 (n)a n dqR
1 (n)
both decrease in n, the right-hand side of the equation decreases in n.T h es o l u t i o nf o rn
to the equation is unique if it exists. Existence can be veriﬁed with the assumptions on
(h,u,ψ). Denote the solution as n1 ∈ (σ,1).
Similarly, in Case TS, I can rewrite (2.12) as
2h0 (1 − n)
αn



















and show that that a unique solution exists. Denote the solution as n3 ∈ (σ,1).
Denote the equilibrium value of n in Case IS as n2, and the solution for S to (2.19) as







2 (S (n),n),wherei = G,R. (C.3)
Then, (2.12) in Case IS can be rewritten as follows:
h
























Ie s t a b l i s hﬁrst existence and uniqueness of the solution to this equation when z =0 .
When z =0 ,t h es o l u t i o nS(n) to (2.19) yields qG
2 (n)=qR
2 (n) and hence k∗G (n)=
1k∗R (n). Diﬀerentiating (2.19) with respect to n to obtain S0(n), I can compute the following











+ f2 < 0.









(1 + θ)n(n − σ)
"














Note that the expression inside [.]d e c r e a s e si nS.S i n c e S ≥ β/γ and n>n− σ,Ic a n
show that the expression is less than (γ − γ0)/β,w h e r eγ0 is deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 . 1 .
If γ ∈ (β,γ0), the above derivative is negative, in wh i c hc a s et h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( C . 4 )
decreases in n. Because the left-hand side increases in n, the solution to (C.4) is unique if
γ ∈ (β,γ0)a n dz = 0. Existence of the solution follows from the assumptions on (h,u,ψ).
Since the solution is continuous in z in a neighborhood of z = 0, then the solution to
(C.4) exists and is unique if γ ∈ (β,γ0)a n di fz is suﬃciently small.
Part 3. Compare the n’es and q’s among the three cases. First, I show that n1 <n 3.
















The ﬁrst inequality comes from the facts that θ ≤ θ1 in Case PS and that f(k,n) decreases
in k. The second inequality comes from the fact that θ1 ≤ 1/[1 + 2μ(n1)] < 1. Moreover,
because Θ3 (n)=1+2 μ(n)w h e nz =0 ,t h e nθ3 > 1w h e nz is suﬃciently small. For any


















The ﬁrst equality comes from θ3 > 1, and the second inequality from θ ≥ θ3 in Case TS.
Thus, for suﬃciently small z and for any ﬁxed n ∈ (σ,1), the right-hand side of (C.1) is
strictly smaller than that of (C.2). As a result, n1 <n 3 when z is small.


















[1 − S (n)].
If I substitute these expressions and qi
2 (n)=Qi
2 (S (n),n) into (C.4) and treat S as a
separate variable, then the right-hand side of (C.4) becomes a decreasing function of S
at z =0 . W h e nS → β/γ, (C.4) becomes (C.2), and so n2 → n3.W h e n S → 1, (C.4)
becomes (C.1), and so n2 → n1. This procedure also shows that n1 <n 2 <n 3 when z is
suﬃciently small.
Third, I compare qR
1 (n1)w i t hqR
3 (n3). Consider the case z =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,Θ3(n)=








3 (n3) ≥ qG














n3−σ [1 + μ(n3)]
.
The equality comes from (C.2). Similarly, when z =0 ,qR
1 (n1) ≤ qG














n1−σ [1 + μ(n1)]
.
Because the function n
n−σ [1 + μ(n)] decreases in n, the last expression increases in n.S i n c e






3 (n3)) − ψ(q
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3 (n3) >q R
1 (n1)w h e nz = 0 and, hence, when z is suﬃciently small.
A similar procedure, together with the facts that S ∈ (β/γ,1) and n2 ∈ (n1,n 3), leads
to the result that qR
1 (n1) <q R
2 (n2) <q R
3 (n3). QED
D. Derivations and Proofs for Section 4
In this appendix, I characterize the equilibrium of the economy described in section 4 and
prove Proposition 4.1. Start with the household’s optimization problem in section 4. Let
λGj be the Lagrangian multiplier of (4.1), λRp of (4.2), and λRg of (4.3). These multipliers
3are multiplied by the number of the corresponding trades before being incorporated into
the Lagrangian of the maximization problem. Similar to (2.8), I can derive the ﬁrst-order
















,w h e r ei ∈ {G,R} and j ∈ {p,g}.( D . 1 )
To proceed, let me establish the following lemma:
Lemma D.1. (i) Either λGp > 0 and λGg > 0,o rλGP = λGg =0 ; (ii) λGg = λGp ≡ λG,
xGg = xGp ≡ xG and qGg = qGp ≡ qG; (iii) for all z>0, the equilibrium generates
λRp ≤ λRg, xRp ≥ xRg and qRp ≥ qRg, with equality if and only if λRg =0(= λRp).
Proof. To prove (i), suppose ﬁrst that λGp > 0. Then, xGp =( m + b)/(n − σ) ≥ xGg.
This result and (4.1) together imply ψ(qGp) ≥ ψ(qGg), and so qGp ≥ qGg. Substituting the











That is, λGg ≥ λGp.T h u s ,λGp > 0 implies λGg > 0. Similarly, λGg > 0 implies λGp > 0.
For (ii), consider ﬁrst the case λGp > 0a n dλGg > 0 .T h e n( 4 . 1 )b i n d sf o rb o t hj = p
and j = g. These binding constraints immediately yield qGp = qGg and xGp = xGg. Then,
(D.1) for i = G yields λGp = λGg. By (i) above, the only remaining case to be considered
is λGp = λGg =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,( D . 1 )f o ri = G implies qGp = qGg,a n dt h ee q u a l i t yp a r to f
(4.1) implies xGp = xGg.










where the ﬁrst (strict) inequality follows from the assumption z>0. With (4.2) and (4.3),
the above result implies ψ(qRp) > ψ(qRg)a n ds oqRp >q Rg.T h e n ,( D . 1 )f o ri = R implies
λRp < λRg, as stated above. Now suppose λRp =0 .I fλRg = 0 as well, then (D.1) for i = R
implies qRp = qRg. In this case, (4.2) and (4.3) imply xRp = xRg.I fλRg > 0( b u tλRp =0 ) ,









4That is, qRp >q Rg. In this case, (4.2) and (4.3) imply xRp >x Rg. QED
As stated in the main text, let me focus on the case where λGp > 0a n dλRp > 0. Then,
Lemma D.1 implies that λGg > 0a n dλRg > 0. That is, all the trading constraints in (4.1)
— (4.3) bind. Moreover, xGg = xGp ≡ xG and qGg = qGp ≡ qG.F u r t h e r m o r e ,w i t hλG > 0










This result yields qRp = qG.
In a trade where the legal restriction is enforced, the quantity of (red) goods traded











where I have used the fact that b = z in the equilibrium. Similarly, I can express the




















Note that qRg <q G and cR <c G for all z>0. Also, qRg ↑ qG and cR ↑ cG as z ↓ 0.
In the symmetric equilibrium, Q = q and N = n. Two conditions determine qG and n
in the equilibrium. The ﬁrst is the envelope condition for money holdings. Deriving this










































Now I ﬁnd the restrictions on θ which support the current case to be the equilibrium, i.e.,
t h ec a s ew i t hλG > 0a n dλRp > 0. The restriction λG > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt ou0(cG)/ψ0(qG) >
51( s e e( D . 1 ) ) . U s i n gt h ef u n c t i o nf(k,n)d e ﬁn e di n( 4 . 5 ) ,Ir e w r i t et h i sr e s t r i c t i o na s
qG <f (1,n). Because the right-hand side of (D.4) is a decreasing function of qG,t h e n
qG <f (1,n) if and only if 2(1 + μ) > RHS(D.4)|qG=f(1,n). Rewrite this condition as












The restriction λRp > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt oθ > ψ0(qG)/u0(cR)( s e e( D . 1 ) ) . U s e( D . 4 )t o








Under mild assumptions, the right-hand side of the above inequality is a decreasing function
of qG.L e tˆ q(n)b et h es o l u t i o nf o rqG to the equality form of the above relation. Then,
λRp > 0i fa n do n l yi fqG > ˆ q(n). Denote ˆ qRg(n)=qRG(ˆ q(n)) and ˆ ci(n)=ci(ˆ q(n),n),
where i ∈ {G,R}. Then, (D.4) implies that qG > ˆ q(n) if and only if θ > Θ1(n), where
Θ1(n) ≡




ψ0(ˆ q(n)) + π
ψ0(ˆ qRg(n))
i .
Therefore, the focused case occurs if and only if Θ1(n) < θ < Θ3(n). Note that when z ↓ 0,
Θ1(n) −→ 1/(1 + 2μ)a n dΘ3(n) −→ 1+2 μ.T h u s , f o r s m a l l z>0, the interior of the
interval (Θ1(n),Θ3(n)) is non-empty for all γ > β and contains the value 1.
Now I prove Proposition 4.1. As in the proof of Proposition 3.3, I ﬁrst ﬁnd the condition
under which optimal money growth is γ > β. Then, given any γ > β, I show that increasing
z from 0 to a slightly positive number increases social welfare.
Examine ﬁrst the eﬀects of money growth at z =0 . W h e nz =0 ,t h ea b o v ea n a l y s i s
implies qRg = qG and cR = cG. Denote the common level of the q’s as q and the common
level of the c’es as c. Then, at z = 0, (D.4) and (D.6) become:
q = f(k,n)w h e r e k =
2(1 + μ)
1+θ




0(1 − n)=[ 1+μ(n)][qψ
0(q) − ψ(q)].
6Also, the welfare measure in (4.4) simpliﬁes to:
(1 + g)(1 − β)v
s =( 1+θ)u(c) − α(n + g)ψ(q)+h.
Diﬀerentiating (D.5) and the three equations above with respect to γ and evaluating the












< 0 ⇐⇒ (3.2).
Now examine the eﬀects of the legal restriction, captured by the eﬀects of z.F i xγ at
an arbitrary level above β.D i ﬀerentiating (D.5), (D.2) and (D.4) with respect to z and
evaluating the derivatives at z =0 ,Ic a ne x p r e s sdμ/dz, dqRg/dz,a n ddqG/dz in terms of
dn/dz.D i ﬀerentiating (D.6) with respect to z, evaluating at z = 0, and substituting the
























where q is given by (D.7). Finally, diﬀerentiating the welfare measure in (4.4) with respect










(1 + g)(1 − β)
.
This derivative is positive if and only if θ < 1. Recall that when z = 0, the case focused on
here exists only when 1/(1+2μ) < θ < 1+2μ. Thus, the legal restriction improves welfare
if and only if 1/(1+2μ) < θ < 1. Under (3.2), this improvement occurs even when money
growth is set optimally. This completes the proofs of Proposition 4.1 and section 4. QED
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